Ethical Freedom
In a relational monism, freedom cannot be conceived as an autonomous property of an isolated subject, nor as a metaphysical privilege grounded in an abstract notion of will. Rather, freedom emerges as a modal expression of relational dynamics, a way in which a monad maintains, transforms, or transcends its stabilised configurations within a world constituted by interdependent relations. Ethical freedom, in this framework, is not a distinct species of freedom but its highest and most structurally adequate form: the form in which the subject’s possibilities are exercised with regard to the possibilities of the Other.
Ethical freedom is therefore not an externally imposed moral constraint but an immanent principle of coexistence. It arises from ontology, not from normativity. If being itself is relational, then freedom—understood as the capacity to modulate relational configurations—must also be relational. Ethical freedom thus appears not as a limitation of freedom but as its completion, for only in the presence of the Other does freedom reveal its full structure.
1. Freedom as Relational Modality
Every monad—whether a biological organism or a reflective subject—exists as a constituted relational stabilisation. Such stabilisations are never final; they may be loosened, reconfigured, or reinforced. From this follow three fundamental modalities of freedom:
- freedom from: the capacity to loosen or interrupt an existing relational configuration;
- freedom to: the capacity to establish a new relational configuration;
- freedom of choice: the set of relationally possible stabilisations available in a given situation.
These modalities are not metaphysical abstractions but immanent features of relational existence. They arise from the dynamic nature of the world itself. Yet they acquire an ethical dimension only in the presence of the Other—understood not merely as another human being but as any relational configuration possessing its own dynamic integrity.
2. The Other as the Condition of Freedom
In relational monism, the Other is not an obstacle to freedom but its condition of possibility. A subject cannot be free in absolute isolation, for isolation would entail the absence of relations and thus the absence of existence. Freedom is possible only where there is co‑existence, and therefore only where the Other is present.
This leads to a central thesis:
Ethical freedom is the capacity to exercise one’s relational possibilities in a manner that does not destroy the relational possibilities of the Other.
This is not a moral injunction but an ontological consequence. To damage the relational integrity of the Other is to damage the relational field upon which one’s own integrity depends. Ethical responsibility thus arises not from duty but from the structure of being.
This insight resonates with Levinas’s claim that the presence of the Other imposes a form of responsibility prior to choice, though here responsibility is grounded not in transcendence but in relational ontology.¹
3. Freedom From: The Interruption of Violence
“Freedom from” denotes the capacity to loosen or interrupt an existing relational stabilisation. Biologically, it corresponds to behavioural flexibility; phenomenologically, to the suspension of habit; ontologically, to the opening of new relational space.
Ethically, “freedom from” is the capacity to interrupt the chain of violence—a chain that, in a relational world, easily becomes a self‑reinforcing stabilisation. The subject who refrains from repeating what has been inflicted upon them does not act against nature but in accordance with a deeper relational dynamic: the creation of space for alternative configurations.
This echoes Tischner’s insight that evil perpetuates itself through relational closure, and that ethical action consists in reopening the space of encounter.²
4. Freedom To: The Capacity for Response
“Freedom to” is the capacity to establish a new relational stabilisation. Ethically, it signifies the capacity to respond in a manner that does not reduce the Other to an instrument or function.
Ethical freedom is not arbitrary spontaneity but creative responsiveness. It acknowledges that the Other possesses their own relational possibilities, which must be preserved rather than absorbed. Ethical response is thus a form of co‑constitution, not imposition.
This is consonant with Buber’s distinction between the I–Thou and I–It relations: ethical freedom corresponds to the former, where the Other is encountered as a partner in relation rather than an object of use.³
5. Freedom of Choice: The Space of Responsibility
Freedom of choice is not absolute; it is constrained by the structure of the monad and the situation. The subject cannot choose everything but can choose among what is relationally possible.
This is precisely why freedom of choice is the locus of responsibility. If several stabilisations are possible, the selection of one affects not only the subject but also the Other. Responsibility is therefore not an external burden but a natural consequence of relational ontology: every choice co‑shapes the relational world.
Wojtyła’s analysis of the person as a self‑determining agent aligns with this view, though here self‑determination is embedded within a relational field rather than grounded in metaphysical substance.⁴
6. Ethical Freedom as Meta‑Structure
Ethical freedom is not a fourth type of freedom but a meta‑structure that:
- limits freedom from,
- orients freedom to,
- organises freedom of choice.
This limitation is not external but internal to relational existence. Ethical freedom is the capacity to maintain one’s relational integrity in a manner that does not destroy the integrity of the Other.
In this sense, ethical freedom is the most realistic form of freedom, for it acknowledges that being is relational and that freedom must therefore be relational as well.
This recalls Spinoza’s notion that true freedom arises from understanding the necessity of the relational order of nature, though here necessity is dynamic and relational rather than geometric.⁵
7. Consequence: Ethics as an Immanent Principle
In relational monism, ethics is not a set of norms but an immanent principle of the world’s structure. If the world is a dynamic network of relations, and if the subject exists as a relational stabilisation, then:
- freedom is a modality of relation,
- responsibility is a consequence of coexistence,
- ethics is an internal principle of persistence.
Ethical freedom is therefore not a moral choice but the most adequate mode of existence in a relational world. There is no need for transcendence or external law. There is only the world, which persists through relations, and the subject, who is free only insofar as they co‑create these relations rather than destroy them.